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ABSTRACT 
 This paper aims to explore the role of region in economy-based assessments of 
the government. Both economic perception and outlook have strong effects on 
evaluations of the federal government, the President, and Congress. Furthermore, 
economic concerns are different across regions, and vary over time. Prospective 
evaluations of the economy differ based on region, more than retrospective evaluations of 
the economy. These findings suggest that people across the country react differently to 
the state of the national economy, and that region is an important aspect of government 
approval. Though more research will be necessary to explain why regional variation 
across economic evaluations of the government exist, this paper highlights the 
importance of region within government evaluations and suggests some implications of 
it.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The economy intersects political life in a number of ways. Economies and 
governments have a recursive relationship: economic systems are dictated to some extent 
by the government, while the government exists within the context of the economy. In the 
United States, a great deal of emphasis is put on the state of the economy and the ability 
of the government to ensure that it is prosperous. My motivation for this paper is to 
examine more closely the relationship between evaluations of the national economy and 
evaluations of the government, and to explore the role that region might play in this 
relationship. By studying the interaction between the economy and region, I hope to find 
new explanations for the role that the economy plays in political life. I also hope to 
highlight the importance of region within the field of American politics. Finally, I hope to 
shed some light on the 2016 presidential election, in which the roles of the economy and 
region were undeniably important. By gaining a better understanding of regional 
differences, the ways that people think about the economy, and the impact that each of 
these questions has on evaluations of the government, we can answer bigger questions 
about the effectiveness of government democracy, make predictions about the future 
political climate, and make sense of turbulent political times. 
 
Economic Voting and its Limitations 
 Political behaviorists have often considered the state of the economy within the 
context of vote choice. The concept that people assess the government based off of 
economic concerns is, as the authors of The American Voter Revisited put it, “well 
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worn.”1 Since the 1950s and the beginning of mass survey data,2 academics have 
attempted to answer the question of “economic voting'” in countless ways. At a basic 
level, class and economics do play a role in voting. Both evaluations and projections 
about the state of the economy predict vote choice.3 Voters tend to think more about the 
national economy when evaluating the government than their own personal economic 
situations, but not always.4 Education, occupation, party identification, and ideology all 
play a role in economic voting as well.5 6 The field of economic voting is vast and 
valuable. At times, however, it is also inconsistent.  
Economic voting is a compelling but contested area of study within political 
science. The idea that Americans vote to a high extent based off of the economic status or 
progress of the country is certainly valid, but the actual study of economic voting can be 
difficult. Anderson (2007) highlights the uncertainty around the idea of economic voting, 
describing the lack of consensus within the literature as “contingency dilemmas.” If 
hypotheses about economic voting are constantly challenged and overturned, then it is 
possible that researchers are approaching the issue the wrong way.7 Lewis-Beck (1985) 
studied whether the pocketbook model of economic voting was simply an “artifact 
produced by the proximity of the economic and political items in the survey 
																																																								
1 Michael Lewis-Beck, Helmut Norpoth, and William G. Jacoby, The American Voter Revisited (Michigan: 
2 C. J. Anderson, “The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic 
Accountability” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (2007), 271- 296. 
3 Lewis-Beck et al 
4 Brad T. Gomez and J. Matthew Wilson, “Political Sophistication and Economic Voting in the American 
Electorate: A Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution.” American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4 
(2001) 899-914. 
5 Lewis-Beck et al 
6 Brad Lockerbie, Who Votes For the Future? (Ithaca: SUNY Press, 2008). 
7 Anderson 	
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questionnaire.”8 Erikson (2004) further argues that economic responses in surveys have 
an “endogenously induced partisan bias” and therefore should be studied at more of a 
“macro-level.” 9  
Despite criticism, I still believe that the way in which a person perceives the 
economy is one of the most important factors in political life. The media highlights the 
economy as an important aspect of American life; people spend much of their life in 
some sort of work; personal finances are a source of stress. Though the relationship 
between the economy and vote choice is well researched, and for good reason, I wish to 
broaden the conversation and shift to a discussion of evaluations, not just votes. The way 
people feel about the government can say much more about the current political climate 
than vote choice. Vote choice is restricted to actual voters, or at least to survey 
respondents who claim to have voted. Any citizen, however, can have a valid opinion on 
the government. More importantly, votes are not the only measure of a government’s 
success. Legitimacy matters within democracy, and just because a government has been 
elected does not necessarily mean it is legitimate. In order for a democracy to truly 
represent its citizens, the citizens must approve of their democracy. The focus on voting 
has diminished the importance of approval and evaluations, which are necessary aspects 
of a successful democracy.  
																																																								8	Michael Lewis-Beck, “Pocketbook Voting in U.S. National Election Studies: Fact or Artifact?” American 
Journal of Political Science 29 no. 2 (1985) 348-356. 9R. S. Erikson, “Macro vs. Micro-level Perspectives on Economic Voting: Is the Micro-level Evidence 
Endogenously Induced?” Annual Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology, Stanford University, 
(2004). 	
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Affect, Feeling Thermometers, and Government Evaluations 
 The study of affect and emotion is a growing subfield within political science. 
Often, researchers use discrete, fairly static measures of political behavior- such as party 
identification, family tradition, and level of education.  The American Voter (and The 
American Voter Revisited) are masterful examples of work done with these types of 
variables.10 However, some have argued that the use of emotion and affect- how people 
“feel” about groups and individuals- matter just as much in the study of political 
behavior. Emotion and affect are both sources of political action and opinion (see Kim 
2014, Greene 1999 & 2004, Lauderdale 2010, Marcus 1988, Swim and Miller 1999, 
Sniderman et al 1991). Researchers have shown that within the study of a number of 
issues, how respondents feel about an issue or group can predict further political action, 
including vote choice. Kim (2014) found that affect played a significant role in 
accounting for public support of sending troops into foreign conflicts.11 Norton and 
Herek (2013) found useful correlations between feelings towards transgender people and 
different demographic groups.12 Lauderdale (2010) cited the importance of reputation in 
legislative voting, finding that “maverick” politicians were difficult to place on a spatial 
voting model.13 Swim and Miller (1999) examined how “white guilt” affected opinions 																																																								10	Lewis-Beck et al	
11 Kim, Dukhong, “Affect and Public Support for Military Action.” SAGE Open 4:4 (2014).  
12 Aaron T. Norton and Gregory M. Herek “Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Transgender People: Findings 
from a National Probability Sample of U.S.Adults.” Sex Roles 68 (2013) 738-53. 
13 B. E. Lauderdale, “Unpredictable voters in ideal point estimation.” Political Analysis 18 no. 2 (2010), 
151-171. 
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on affirmative action.14 Greene (1999, 2004) found that social identification with a party 
led to increased the amount of partisan political behavior, even when controlling for 
interest and strength of partisanship. It also significantly increased the likelihood that an 
individual would turn out to vote.15 Clearly, emotion can be an important predictor of 
political action.16 
Feeling thermometers are useful measures of affect and emotion. They are not 
perfect measures, and are vulnerable to the same measurement issues found with any 
survey research. For example, Liu and Wang found that face-to-face respondents tended 
to provide systematically higher ratings than other methods of response.17 Wilcox, 
Sigelman, and Cook (1989) found that some respondents systematically rate groups 
higher than others.18 Still, they are used widely in studies of political behavior due to 
their ability to compare respondent attitudes using a single metric, and to measure levels 
of support, ambivalence, and opposition (Norton 2013, Buell and Sigelman 1985). 
Feeling thermometers allow researchers to get a comparable, stable measure of attitude, 
avoiding questions of support that could be misleading.19 They are also useful in 
comparing support across groups due to their simplicity and replicability. Feeling 																																																								14	Janet K. Swim and Deborah L. Miller, “White Guilt: Its Antecedents and Consequences for Attitudes 
Toward Affirmative Action.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25 no. 4 (1999), 500 - 514. 15Steven Greene, “Understanding Party Identification: A Social Identity Approach.” Political Psychology 
20 no. 2 (1999) 393- 403. 16	George E. Marcus, “The Structure of Emotional Response: 1984 Presidential Candidates.” The 
American Political Science Review 82 no. 3 (1988) 737-761. 17Mingnan Liu and Wang, Yichen “Data collection mode effect on feeling thermometer questions: A 
comparison of face-to-face and Web surveys.” Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 212-218. 18	Clyde Wilcox, Lee Sigelman, and Elizabeth Cook “Some Like it Hot: Individual Differences in 
Responses to Group Feeling Thermometers.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 no. 2 (1989) 246-25 19 E. Buell and Lee Sigelman  “An Army That Meets Every Sunday? Popular Support for the Moral 
Majority in 1980.” Social Science Quarterly, 66 no. 2 (1985) 426- 434. 	
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thermometers provide valuable insight into political behavior, and allow for a systematic 
study of affect and emotion.  
Studies in economic voting obviously use vote choice as the dependent variable. 
This paper, despite covering similar topics, does not focus on economic voting. At this 
point in time, the Congress and President that have been elected are unprecedentedly 
unpopular. Examining why a set of officials was elected during a certain election is 
valuable, but does not tell the full story. There are countless reasons for electing a 
candidate- on a macro level, the state of the economy, the proportion of partisans voting, 
or fundraising might be quite useful. On a micro level, however, there are infinitely more 
variables that could explain electoral outcomes. Maybe a representative has close familial 
ties to a small constituency. Maybe everyone happened to hate one candidate less than 
another. Maybe an unpredicted scandal was uncovered the day before election day, 
swinging the outcome in an unexpected direction. Just because the members of Congress 
and the Executive Branch at a given point in time were elected does not mean they were 
elected enthusiastically, or that the country really believes in them. Through the lens of 
federal government evaluations, more can be uncovered about the relationship between 
the populace and the government that represents them.  
 
Retrospective versus Prospective Economic Evaluations 
People assess the economy in a number of ways. Whether voters vote based on 
policy positions or policy outcomes, or whether respondents evaluate past economic 
conditions or make guesses about the future, is unclear. Theoretically, both prospective 
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and retrospective evaluations of the economy and of the government make sense. If a 
voter thinks back- that is, retrospectively- to the performance of a candidate or party- 
policy initiatives that affected her positively, an increase in jobs in her neighborhood, or 
simply overall improvements in her political life- she should vote for that party or 
evaluate it favorably. Elections, in the retrospective voting model, are an evaluation of 
how a candidate or party has done. A feeling thermometer is a sort of report card. Jones 
(2015) studied the messages used by campaigns and found that “discussions of 
economics tend to focus on policy positions rather than policy outcomes” that followed a 
retrospective time horizon. Interestingly, he also found differences between candidates of 
different parties; for example, Republicans focus even more often on the past than 
Democrats.20 Lewis-Beck et. al. (2009) found that present perception of the economy and 
evaluations of how the government was handling the economy were significant indicators 
of vote choice, but relied heavily on party identification.21 Though retrospective 
economic voting is theoretically sound, it has not been consistently supported by data. 
In a prospective model, voters consider how a candidate or party will do if elected 
and evaluate or vote for them accordingly. Based on current knowledge about their 
positions, voters think forward to how they will benefit from either candidate or party in 
question. However, voters still use information gained retrospectively and through 
current events. Prospective voting is a continuation of the retrospective model. Lockerbie 
(2008) states "the past, while not wholly determining one's expectations, may well 
																																																								20	Philip Edward Jones, “Economic Voting Appeals in Congressional Campaigns.” Political 
Communication 32 no. 2 (2015) 206-228. 21	Lewis-Beck et al	
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influence one's forecasts. Ignoring that connection would lead us to understate the power 
and influence of retrospective evaluations on voting behavior."22 Still, using intensive 
statistical modeling, prospective models are much better at predicting voting behavior 
than retrospective models. 
Still, there are notable variations still within the prospective model- political 
sophistication is one factor often tested. Lacy and Christenson (2016) found that 
“variation among voters due to information or sophistication occurs primarily between 
prospective and retrospective evaluations,” with more informed voters voting 
prospectively more often than uninformed voters.23 Alt, Lassen, and Marshall (2015), 
using a Danish experiment, found that sophisticated voters were more likely to correctly 
assess information about economic conditions as credible or not, while unsophisticated 
voters were still likely to consider information and update their beliefs.24 The prospective 
model has more power to help researchers understand voting behavior, especially within 
the field of economic voting. 
Though prospective voting has statistical significance on its side, both theories are 
important. When attempting to explain how people feel about the government, current 
opinions and projections both matter. A current opinion is fairly useless if it can be 
changed immediately. A retrospective evaluation of the government would be useful in 
explaining past events, but does little to predict future behavior. A prospective 																																																								22	Lockerbie	23Dean Lacy and Dino P. Christenson, “Who Votes for the Future? Information, Expectations, and 
Endogeneity in Economic Voting.” Political Behavior 10 (2016). 24	James E. Alt, David D. Lassen, and John Marshall, “Credible Sources and Sophisticated Voters: When 
Does New Information Induce Economic Voting?” The Journal of Politics 78 no. 2 (2015) 327-342. 	
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evaluation, however, takes into account knowledge of a current situation as well as 
optimism or pessimism about the future. Therefore, it has much more power in predicting 
behavior and outcomes. In this paper, the variable referring to a retrospective evaluation 
is “economic perception.” The variable referring to a prospective evaluation is “economic 
outlook.” 
Why Region? 
Whether economic voting is affected in any way by region is largely unexamined. 
At a societal level, differences between regions in the United States exist. Therefore, it 
may be interesting to see if these deep-rooted differences between regions also translate 
into differences in economic evaluations and outlook. The history of the country and 
current political climate display a tendency to divide the country politically based on 
region. Lieske (1993) explains that early settlers to the United States had distinctive 
enthoreligious and cultural traits that later translated into political cultures. Additionally, 
the focus on local self-government contributed to lasting “social and political expression 
to their [the colonists] cultural preferences within geographically defined political 
jurisdictions, namely towns, townships, cities, and counties.”25 Cox (2016) explains that 
the decentralized nature of American regional development is distinct and significant. He 
argues that early economic development was the source of such localized politics. Even 
centralized, federal programs such as “opening up the West and so securing cheaper food 
for the cities of the East, if at the cost of agriculture in New England and the mid-Atlantic 
																																																								
25 Joel Lieske, “Regional Subcultures of the United States.” Journal of Politics 55 (1993) 888-913. 
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states: the land grants to railways, the land grant universities, the Homestead Act,” 
contributed to local and regional development of politics.26 Regional politics has been an 
essential aspect of American politics since the beginning of America itself. 
This historical and economic divergence by region has indeed established itself 
within the collective public mind. In a large-scale psychological study, Rentfrow, Gosling 
and Potter (2008) found “clear patterns of regional variation across the U.S. and strong 
relationships between state-level personality and geographic indicators of crime, social 
capital, religiosity, political values, employment, and health.”27 Rogers and Woods 
(2010) further studied stereotypes across regions of the country and found them to be 
surprisingly accurate. These findings suggest that there is a relationship between region 
and psychology.28 An increased understanding of the interaction between region and the 
economy, and their impact on how Americans view their government, can explain much 
about American political life.  
 
 
MODELING ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT 
Hypotheses 
																																																								26Kevin R. Cox, The Politics of Urban and Regional Development and the American Exception. (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 2016). 27	Peter J. Rentfrow, Samuel D. Gosling, and Jeff Potter, “A Theory of the Emergence, Persistence, and 
Expression of Geographic Variation in Psychological Characteristics.” Perspectives on Psychological 
Science 3 no. 5 (2008) 339-369. 28	Katherine H. Rogers and Dustin Wood, “Accuracy of United States regional personality stereotypes.” 
Journal of Research in Personality 44 no. 6 (2010) 704-713. 	
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Hypothesis 1A: The prospective model will be more powerful than the retrospective 
model. 
Hypothesis 1B: Regional interaction with economic concerns will be stronger in the 
prospective model than in the retrospective model. 
Evaluations of the economy necessarily depend on a number of factors. A 
respondent's background will both shape their current opinions of and inform their 
projections about policies. The economy and politics are so closely weaved that 
economic concerns should have an effect on political opinions regardless of a timeframe. 
In order to get a full understanding of the interaction between region and the economy 
and its effect on government evaluations, I use both models. However, because the 
prospective model encompasses the retrospective model by definition, I predict more 
robust results from the prospective model. 
 
Hypothesis 2A: Economic concerns differ between regions. 
Hypothesis 2B: The extent to which economic concerns affect evaluations of the 
government is different depending on region. 
It is evident that regional differences do exist within the United States. During 
election years, pundits do extensive electoral math in which they consider how each 
candidate might perform in different parts of the country. If regional differences did not 
exist, such considerations would not be necessary. The history of the United States has 
allowed different cultures and customs to flourish throughout different regions of the 
country. The East Coast, for example, was colonized by the British, while some Western 
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states did not become a part of the U.S. until nearly a century after the revolution. The 
Civil War quite literally divided the Southern Confederacy from the rest of the country. 
Different industries flourished in different regions; different ethnic groups immigrated to 
different areas; different political parties dominated different states. Though the effects of 
globalization and technology have brought more homogeneity to the country- as cultures 
and customs begin to merge- variations exist between regions of the country, and this 
variation translates into political differences. This explains the ability of Americans to 
correctly stereotype other Americans based off of region, and even distinguish similar 
states.29 
If differences in culture and politics exist between regions of the country, then 
differences in political issues should also exist. I predict that the way in which people 
view the economy, and the way that they judge the government based on their opinions of 
the economy, will be influenced by the region in which they reside.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Despite regional differences, trends will be similar over time. 
While I predict that region plays an important role in predicting the effect of 
economic perception and outlook, I also predict that all regions will follow similar trends. 
Though the country has important regional differences, none are so drastic that there 
might be divergent trends across region. The national economy affects all regions- that is, 
national economic concerns are by definition not limited to certain regions. Though I 
																																																								29	Rogers and Wood 
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predict variation across trends, regional politics are not so divergent that I expect 
drastically different results over time.  
 
Data and Research Design 
For this study I used the National Election Studies Cumulative Dataset. The 
National Election survey is useful in that is has accumulated data that is reliable and 
comparable over many elections. The survey questions that I use have been asked since 
1980, giving me a sizable and relevant dataset. The model uses an ordinary least squares 
regression, which is possible due to the large range of possible values on the dependent 
variable. 
 
Feeling Thermometers 
Feeling thermometers are a viable measure of public opinion on groups and 
individuals.30 31 32 Not only are they reliable and comparable across groups, they are 
important indicators of political opinions and beliefs. How people feel about their 
government is an important aspect of democracy. Feeling thermometers give a broad 
view of support and opposition to groups.33 Because I am examining individual-level, 
sociotropic evaluations of the economy, it is also important that I use an individual-level 
evaluation variable. Though the main focus of this paper is on the broadest evaluation of 
																																																								30	Marcus	31	P. Sniderman., T. Piazza, P. Tetlock, & A. Kendrick, “The New Racism.” American Journal of Political 
Science 35 no. 2 (1991) 423-447. 32	Greene, 1999	33	Buell and Sigelman	
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the government- the federal Government feeling thermometer- I also run tests for the 
President and Congress feeling thermometers. They are coded from 1 to 100. The NES 
groups 97 through 100 as one group.  
 
Economic Perception and Outlook  
Because I am studying both retrospective and prospective voting, I used two 
economic perception survey questions. To focus on the retrospective paradigm, I used the 
following question:  
How about (1996-LATER: Now thinking about) the economy (1990,1994- later: 
in the country as a whole)? Would you say that over the past year the nation's 
economy has gotten better, stayed (all yrs. exc 1984: about) the same or gotten 
worse? 
It is coded from 1 to 3, with 1 representing "worse" and 3 " better."  
For prospective voters, I used the next survey question:  
What about the next 12 months (1980,1982: or ALL YEARS EXC. 2000: Do you 
expect the (1986,1988,1992: national) worse, or stay about the same? 2000 
VERSION 1: Do you expect the economy, in the country as stay about the same, 
or get worse? 2000 VERSION 2: Do you expect the economy, in the country as 
about the same, or get better? 
It is coded from 1 to 3, with 1 representing "worse" and 3 "better." 
 
Interaction Terms 
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In order to test whether the effect of the economy on federal government feeling 
thermometers is different depending on region, I created interaction terms by multiplying 
each region by the economic perception and outlook variable. I use the northeast as the 
baseline dummy. 
 
Fixed Effects 
In order to control for variation in responses across years, I dummied out each 
election year from 1980 through 2012 except for 1984, when the feeling thermometers 
were not used. Within my models, I used the 2012 dummy as a baseline. 
 
Controls 
I use race, gender, and party identification as controls. Much behavioral work 
controls for these variables because certain demographic groups tend to feel similarly 
about the government and public policies, potentially causing collinearity or 
spuriousness. Lacy and Christenson (2016) justify controls for gender and race due to the 
possibility that information and tendencies to vote for one party may covary with voter 
characteristics.34  Gender is coded 1 for males and 2 for females. Race has 7 categories 
and is coded as follows: White, Non-Hispanic is coded as 1, Black, Non-Hispanic is 
coded as 2, Asian or Pacific Islander is coded as 3, American Indian or Alaska Native is 
coded as 4, Hispanic is coded as 5, other or multiple races is coded as 6, and non-white 
and non black is coded as 7. Party identification may also contribute to partisan bias. For 																																																								34	Lacy and Christenson	
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example, Greene (1999) found that identification with a party increased partisan 
behavior.35 Kramer (1983) notes that vote preference may influence economic 
perception.36 To avoid bias, controlling for party is essential.  In my model, Democrats 
are coded as 1, independents including leaners are coded as 2, and Republicans are coded 
as 3.  
 
Defining Regions 
Though most Americans could recognize that different regions of the country 
exist- and, as psychologists have explained, even identify stereotypes about different 
regions,37 actually defining regions of the United States is difficult. The ANES uses four 
classifications- Northeast, North Central, South, and West. The Census uses nine 
classifications: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, 
South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. If the 
ANES classification is too broad, the census classification may be overly selective. 
Lieske (1993), using factors including religion, ethnicity, and social structure and 
behavior, attempts to define and map regional subcultures. Though his results are helpful 
in seeing the rich diversity of the United States, they do not give a macro-level distinction 
of region.38 Morgan and England (1987) use a number of measures to place states into 
																																																								35	Green, 1999	
36  Gerald Kramer, “The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate vs. Individual Level Findings on 
Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting.” American Political Science Review 77 (1983) 92-111. 
 	37	Rogers and Wood	38	Lieske	
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five classifications: Southern, Northeast Industrial, Midwest Industrial, Plains, and 
Growth. Though statistically compelling, their “growth” classification does not seem to 
fit because of its cultural and geographical variation: Texas and New Hampshire- two 
objectively different states- are both in this category.39 
I chose to use five regions so that my results are broad enough to make legitimate 
and substantial claims, but still thorough enough to show significant differences. I 
defined my regions using basic geography and census classifications, Rogers and Wood's 
psychological stereotype connections, Morgan and England's classifications, and 
Melcher’s suggestions. Though the census classifications make geographic sense, from a 
political standpoint, some states belong in different groupings. For example, Maryland, 
Delaware, and Washington D.C. are more similar to northern states than southern ones. 
Morgan and England classify neither Maryland nor Delaware as Southern, and they are 
stereotyped differently than Southern states in Rogers and Wood’s study. James Melcher, 
an American Midwestern scholar, defines the Midwest according to Carolyn Lieberg's 
book Calling the Midwest Home and uses this definition in courses on regional politics.40 
Due to the small size of the Southwest and West regions I considered combining them, 
but decided instead to separate them according loosely to Rogers and Wood's state 
pairings. My main motivation was to keep California and Texas separate due to their 
																																																								39	David R. Morgan and Robert E. England, “Classifying the American States: An Update.” Social Science 
Quarterly 68 no. 2 (1987) 405-417. 	40	James P. Melcher, “Bringing It All Back Home: The Issues Involved in Teaching a U. S. Regional 
Politics Course.” Political Science and Politics 32 no. 1 (1999) 77-82. 	
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large sizes and differing social and political makeups. The region variable is coded as 
follows:  
Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,  
        Vermont, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, District of  
         Columbia, Maryland  
Southeast: Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West     
        Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi and Tennessee 
Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,    
      Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota 
Southwest: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico,  
        Nevada 
West: Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington,   
           Colorado 
 
RESULTS 
Overall Effects of the Economy of Government Evaluations 
As the literature predicts, perception of the national economy does have a 
significant effect on feelings towards the federal government. When controlling for year, 
gender, race, and party identification, each additional level of the economic perception 
variable increases feelings towards the government by about 8 “degrees” This suggests 
that Americans who feel increasingly better about the state of the economy do in fact feel 
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better about the government as well, despite the overall low ratings of the federal 
government. 
To see if this trend continues for specific groups within the federal government, I 
ran the same test for Congress and the President. The coefficient is still positive when 
looking at Congress controlling for year, though the magnitude is smaller: each additional 
value of economic perception corresponds with a 3.5 degree increase. When looking 
specifically at the president, controlling for year, the magnitude is greater- each 
additional value of the economic perception variable corresponds with a 22 degree 
increase in the president's feeling thermometer. These results are hardly surprising- 
researchers, history, and common sense all support a retrospective theory of voting and 
support for the government. People happy with the way things are going should be 
pleased with the officials in power. 
Results are similar for the prospective model. Controlling for year, gender, race, 
and party identification, increases in economic outlook increase feeling thermometer 
ratings of the Federal Government, Congress, and the President. Though the coefficients 
in the prospective model are smaller than in the retrospective model, they are all 
significant. Whether the differences in magnitude are substantial is unclear. It is possible 
that respondents feel more strongly about the present than the future, and therefore tend 
to reward elected officials more positively for present economic conditions than future 
ones. Regardless, the definitively positive effect of economic perception and outlook on 
feeling thermometers indicates that the economy does play an important role in how 
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citizens feel about their government. Results can be found and compared in the table 
below. 
 
Overall Effects of Economic Perception and Outlook on the Government 
 Economic Perception Economic Outlook 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
 
 Federal 
Government 
Congress President Federal 
Government 
Congress President 
Economic 
Perception 
8.256 *** 
(.417) 
3.565*** 
(.390) 
22.790*** 
(.547) 
- - - 
Economic 
Outlook 
- - - 6.089*** 
(.246) 
3.264*** 
(.233) 
11.640*** 
(.340) 
1980 9.420*** 
(.927) 
13.252*** 
(.868) 
10.344*** 
(1.217) 
11.873*** 
(.683) 
17.853*** 
(.649) 
3.404*** 
(.945) 
1988 11.266*** 
(.796) 
14.808*** 
(.745) 
2.522* 
(1.045) 
16.247*** 
(.609) 
19.920*** 
(.579) 
8.175*** 
(.843) 
1992 5.955*** 
(.714) 
7.517*** 
(.669) 
3.737*** 
(.938) 
6.838*** 
(.546) 
10.688*** 
(.519) 
-2.289** 
(.756) 
1996 5.908*** 
(.867) 
11.057*** 
(.811) 
-3.758** 
(1.138) 
11.987*** 
(.621) 
15.763*** 
(.590) 
4.699*** 
(.860) 
2000 7.318*** 
(.782) 
11.177*** 
(.731) 
-7.354*** 
(1.026) 
13.968*** 
(.629) 
17.076*** 
(.597) 
.833 
(.870) 
2004 11.045*** 
(1.005) 
12.071*** 
(.940) 
-1.613 (-
1.613) 
15.415*** 
(.726) 
17.173*** 
(.689) 
.748 
(1.004) 
2008 9.019*** 
(.715) 
10.211*** 
(.669) 
-8.061*** 
(.938) 
8.597*** 
(.715) 
12.568*** 
(.679) 
-18.391*** 
(.989) 
Gender 4.022*** 
(.429) 
4.144*** 
(.401) 
3.246 *** 
(.563)  
3.401*** 
(.341) 
4.095*** 
(.325) 
2.070*** 
(.473) 
Party 
Identification 
-3.645*** 
(.234) 
-2.311*** 
(.219) 
-2.968*** 
(.308) 
-3.757*** 
(.187) 
-1.806*** 
(.178) 
-6.202*** 
(.259) 
Race 2.062*** 
(.151) 
1.682*** 
(.142) 
1.355*** 
(.199) 
2.203*** 
(.124) 
1.993*** 
(.118) 
1.324*** 
(.172) 
Intercept 27.654*** 
(1.238) 
33.924*** 
(1.159) 
12.592*** 
(1.625) 
26.871*** 
(.975) 
27.515*** 
(.926) 
36.342*** 
(1.350) 
* p < .10  **p < .05  ***p < .001      
Table 1  
 
Effects of Region and Economic Perception on Government Evaluations 
Overall, each additional value of economic perception corresponds with an 
increase in feeling thermometer ratings. Coefficients were similar for each feeling 
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thermometer in both models- without and with region. The federal government feeling 
thermometer increases by about 8 degrees with each additional value of economic 
perception; the Congress feeling thermometer increases by about 4.5; the President by 
about 24. There is an undeniable relationship between economic factors and ratings of the 
government, consistent with economic voting literature.  
Region appears to have a direct impact on government feeling thermometer 
scores, but not an interactive effect on the impact of the economy in government feeling 
thermometer scores. Region may be a factor in how people rate the government 
generally, but it does not appear to impact economic ratings of the government. This 
suggests that regional differences that do occur in federal government feeling 
thermometers are not explained by economic perception. Coefficients are virtually the 
same between direct and interactive models, further indicating that interactions between 
region and economic perception are negligible. The three feeling thermometers are 
similarly impacted by the controls. The presidential feeling thermometer does differ from 
the other models, probably due to the variability of presidential approval. Ratings of the 
president may be more personal and less generalizable than ratings of Congress of the 
federal government as a whole. The President is a single person, susceptible to personal 
opinions that might be different than opinions of the rest of the government. However, 
the results for the three models generally show the same trends, suggesting that there is a 
significant relationship between economic perception and ratings of the government, and, 
to an extent, region and ratings of the government. Direct and interactive effects for each 
feeling thermometer can be compared in the following tables. 
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Federal Government Feeling Thermometer, Economic Perception, and Region- Direct and Interactive 
Effects 
Direct Interactive 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
-  Southeast * Economic 
Perception 
1.438 
(1.120) 
-  Midwest * Economic 
Perception 
.667 
(1.118) 
-  Southwest * Economic 
Perception 
2.197* 
(1.222) 
-  West * Economic Perception 1.192 
(1.150) 
Economic Perception 8.160*** 
(.416) 
Economic Perception 7.096*** 
(.850) 
Southeast 2.235** 
(.662) 
Southeast -.115 
(1.927) 
Midwest -1.059 
(.656) 
Midwest -2.150 
(1.938) 
Southwest 2.283** 
(.745) 
Southwest -1.286 
(2.121) 
West -2.431*** 
(.680) 
West -4.380* 
(1.990) 
1980 9.524*** 
(.925) 
1980 9.466*** 
(.925) 
1988 11.515*** 
(.795) 
1988 11.564*** 
(.796) 
1992 6.022*** 
(.713) 
1992 5.974*** 
(.713) 
1996 5.923*** 
(.865) 
1996 5.920*** 
(.865) 
2000 7.557*** 
(.780) 
2000 7.598*** 
(.781) 
2004 11.309*** 
(1.001) 
2004 11.318*** 
(1.002) 
2008 8.777*** 
(.714) 
2008 8.865*** 
(.716) 
Gender 3.916*** 
(.428) 
Gender 3.932*** 
(.428) 
Party Identification -3.629*** 
(.234) 
Party Identification -3.627*** 
(.234) 
Race 2.012*** 
(.156) 
Race 2.008*** 
(.157) 
Intercept 27.833*** 
(1.304) 
Intercept 29.541*** 
(1.788) N=10459,	R2=.172	 N=10459,	R2=.171	*	p	<	.10		**p	<	.05		***p	<	.001				  
Table 2 
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Congress Feeling Thermometer, Economic Perception, and Region- Direct and Interactive Effects 
Direct Interactive 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
-  Southeast * Economic 
Perception 
.643 
(1.039) 
-  Midwest * Economic 
Perception 
-.136 
(1.047) 
-  Southwest * Economic 
Perception 
1.797 
(1.145) 
-  West * Economic Perception .636 
(1.076) 
Economic Perception 3.475*** 
(.389) 
Economic Perception 2.947*** 
(.796) 
Southeast 2.314*** 
(.619) 
Southeast 1.259  
(1.804) 
Midwest -.189 
(.614) 
Midwest .031 
(1.815) 
Southwest 2.734*** 
(.698) 
Southwest -.182 
(1.986) 
West -1.584*** 
(.652) 
West -2.627 
(1.863) 
1980 13.351** 
(.866) 
1980 13.294*** 
(.866) 
1988 15.021*** 
(.744) 
1988 15.086*** 
(.745) 
1992 7.578*** 
(.667) 
1992 7.550*** 
(.668) 
1996 11.051*** 
(.809) 
1996 11.074*** 
(.810) 
2000 11.376*** 
(.730) 
2000 11.413*** 
(.731) 
2004 12.301*** 
(.938) 
2004 12.317*** 
(.938) 
2008 9.963*** 
(.669) 
2008 10.048*** 
(.670) 
Gender 4.051*** 
(.401) 
Gender 4.070*** 
(.401) 
Party Identification -2.311*** 
(.219) 
Party Identification -2.307*** 
(.219) 
Race 1.623*** 
(.146) 
Race 1.623*** 
(.147) 
Intercept 33.676*** 
(1.220) 
Intercept 34.489*** 
(1.674) N=10459,	R2=.142	 N=10459,	R2=.142	*	p	<	.10		**p	<	.05		***p	<	.001				  
Table 3 
President Feeling Thermometer, Economic Perception, and Region- Direct and Interactive Effects 
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Direct Interactive 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
-  Southeast * Economic 
Perception 
	-.175 
(1.460) 
-  Midwest * Economic 
Perception 
-.406 
(1.471) 
-  Southwest * Economic 
Perception 
.936 
(1.608) 
-  West * Economic Perception -.607 
(1.512) 
Economic Perception 22.766*** 
(.546) 
Economic Perception 22.867*** 
(1.118) 
Southeast 1.610* 
(.870) 
Southeast 1.892 
(2.534) 
Midwest -.338  
(.863) 
Midwest .323 
(2.550) 
Southwest .013  
(.980) 
Southwest -1.498 
(2.789) 
West -2.512** 
(.916) 
West -1.537 
(2.618) 
1980 10.369*** 
(1.216) 
1980 10.345*** 
(1.217) 
1988 2.599* 
(1.045) 
1988 2.651** 
(1.047) 
1992 3.739*** 
(.937) 
1992 3.738*** 
(.938) 
1996 -3.783** 
(1.136) 
1996 -3.760** 
(1.138) 
2000 -7.130*** 
(1.034) 
2000 -7.096*** 
(1.027) 
2004 -1.440  
(1.318) 
2004 -1.431 
(1.318) 
2008 -8.073*** 
(.940) 
2008 -8.028*** 
(.942) 
Gender 3.167*** 
(.563) 
Gender 3.180*** 
(.563) 
Party Identification -2.931*** 
(.307) 
Party Identification -2.713*** 
(.307) 
Race 1.446*** 
(.206) 
Race 1.450*** 
(.206) 
Intercept 12.677*** 
(1.714) 
Intercept 12.464*** 
(2.352) N=10459,	R2=.229	 N=10459,	R2=.171	*	p	<	.10		**p	<	.05		***p	<	.001				  
Table 4 
Clearly, there are some differences between regions in economic ratings of the 
government. All regions have a similar relationship between economic perception and 
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federal government feeling thermometers, but it is not the same. This suggests that there 
is some unexplained difference between regions. Compared to the northeast, the other 
regions do indeed see different relationships. For example, compared to the Northeast 
(the baseline), the Southwest has the strongest relationship between economic perception 
and ratings of the federal government. The Midwest, on the other hand, has a smaller 
effect, rating the government lower than the Northeast even at positive levels of 
economic perception. However, as displayed in the tables, the interactive variables are 
not statistically significant. Therefore, these results may or may not be substantive.  
 
Effects of Region and Economic Outlook on Government Evaluations 
The effect of economic outlook is different than the effect of economic 
perception. When considering the future of the economy, each increasing value of the 
economic outlook variable corresponds with an increase of about 6 degrees on the feeling 
thermometer without interactions and 4.7 with interactive effects. The Congress feeling 
thermometer increased by about 3 degrees with and without interaction, and the President 
feeling thermometer increased by about 11 with and without interactions, consistent with 
earlier findings. This indicates that people assess the government both retrospectively and 
prospectively- that is, both economic perception and outlook have an effect on feelings 
towards the government.  
Region has a significant direct effect on the federal government feeling 
thermometer, a somewhat significant direct effect on the Congressional feeling 
thermometer, and no significant direct effect on the Presidential feeling thermometer. The 
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only significant interactive effects exist in the federal government feeling thermometer, 
suggesting that individuals rate the government differently across region only at a general 
level. Region informs political behavior in a personal way, but individuals tend to rate the 
government based on national trends. Therefore, regional differences may only be 
significant for the most general feeling thermometer, but not more specific feeling 
thermometers. Furthermore, because people may associate individuals with Congress and 
the Presidency, there may be more factors at play in their ratings of these offices. 
However, the federal government feeling thermometer is a nonspecific measure of the 
government, so individual factors will not come into play as often.  
For the Federal Government feeling thermometer, the Southeast has the strongest 
effect, meaning that at the highest levels of economic outlook, people in the Southeast 
rate the federal government higher than in other regions. With each increase on the 
economic outlook variable, the Southeast’s federal government feeling thermometer 
rating increases by 2.041, compared to other regions. The Southwest has the smallest 
effect, meaning that at the highest levels of economic outlook, people in the Southwest 
rate the government lower than in other regions. With every one point increase on the 
economic outlook variable, the Southwest’s federal government feeling thermometer 
rating only increases by 1.008. The Midwest also has a small effect, with an increase of 
1.251 on the feeling thermometer with each increase in economic outlook. For the West, 
each increase of economic outlook corresponds with a 1.569 increase on the federal 
government feeling thermometer compared to the other regions. This indicates that the 
relationship between economic outlook and ratings of the government are indeed 
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different depending on region. The coefficient for economic outlook alone is smaller in 
the interactive model, indicating that regional interactions do have a significant effect on 
federal government feeling thermometers.  
For the Congress feeling thermometer, region has a much smaller effect. The 
interactions between region and economic outlook have small effects on the feeling 
thermometer- only the West region closely approaches 1. This suggests that people in the 
West rate Congress higher than other regions at high levels of economic outlook, but not 
by much. As economic outlook increases, the differences in Congressional feeling 
thermometer scores are very similar across regions. Furthermore, the interactions were 
statistically insignificant.  
Results for the Presidential feeling thermometer were similar- the West has the 
strongest effect of economic outlook on the President, while the Southeast has the 
smallest effect. This means that at a given level of economic outlook, the West has the 
highest ratings of the President while the Southeast has the lowest. Again, however, the 
interactions in this model were statistically insignificant. Results are displayed in the 
tables below: 
 
Federal Government Feeling Thermometer, Economic Outlook, Region- Direct and Interactive Effects 
Direct Interactive 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
-  Southeast * Economic 
Outlook 
2.041** 
(.745) 
-  Midwest * Economic Outlook 1.251* 
(.741) 
-  Southwest * Economic 
Outlook 
1.008 
(.836) 
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-  West * Economic Outlook 1.569** 
(.771) 
Economic Outlook 6.002*** 
(.245) 
Economic Outlook 4.777*** 
(.556) 
Southeast 1.649** 
(.528) 
Southeast -2.803 
(1.709) 
Midwest -.978* 
(.518) 
Midwest -3.688** 
(1.670) 
Southwest 1.670** 
(.603) 
Southwest -.497 
(1.929) 
West -1.956*** 
(.555) 
West -5.340** 
(1.747) 
1980 11.974*** 
(.682) 
1980 11.966*** 
(.682) 
1988 16.413*** 
(.609) 
1988 16.413*** 
(.609) 
1992 6.891*** 
(.545) 
1992 6.900*** 
(.545) 
1996 11.945*** 
(.620) 
1996 11.951*** 
(.620) 
2000 14.079*** 
(.628) 
2000 14.093*** 
(.628) 
2004 15.641*** 
(.725) 
2004 15.621*** 
(.725) 
2008 8.434*** 
(.715) 
2008 8.441*** 
(.715) 
Gender 3.337*** 
(.341) 
Gender 3.346*** 
(.341) 
Party Identification -3.748*** 
(.187) 
Party Identification -3.753*** 
(.187) 
Race 2.168*** 
(.128) 
Race 2.161*** 
(.128) 
Intercept 27.153*** 
(1.026) 
Intercept 29.813*** 
(1.492) 
N=14848, R2=.156 N=14848, R2=.156 *	p	<	.10		**p	<	.05		***p	<	.001				  
Table 5 
Congress Feeling Thermometer, Economic Outlook, Region- Direct and Interactive Effects 
Direct Interactive 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
-  Southeast * Economic 
Perception 
.354 
(.708) 
-  Midwest * Economic 
Perception 
.347 
(.704) 
-  Southwest * Economic 
Perception 
.163  
(.732) 
-  West * Economic Perception .917 
(.732) 
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Economic Perception 3.190*** 
(.233) 
Economic Perception 2.820*** 
(.528) 
Southeast 1.843*** 
(.501) 
Southeast 1.077 
(1.624) 
Midwest -.023 
(.492) 
Midwest -.777  
(1.587) 
Southwest 2.504*** 
(.573) 
Southwest 2.162  
(1.832) 
West -1.238** 
(.527) 
West -3.206* 
(1.660) 
1980 17.960*** 
(.648) 
1980 17.960*** 
(.648) 
1988 20.080*** 
(.578) 
1988 20.086*** 
(.578) 
1992 10.739*** 
(.518) 
1992 10.746*** 
(.518) 
1996 15.697*** 
(.589) 
1996 15.698*** 
(.589) 
2000 17.167*** 
(.597) 
2000 17.179*** 
(.597) 
2004 17.374*** 
(.688) 
2004 17.370*** 
(.688) 
2008 12.366*** 
(.679) 
2008 12.378*** 
(.679) 
Gender 4.031*** 
(.324) 
Gender 4.031*** 
(.324) 
Party Identification -1.814*** 
(.178) 
Party Identification -1.820*** 
(.178) 
Race 1.941*** 
(.122) 
Race 1.938*** 
(.122) 
Intercept 27.305*** 
(.975) 
Intercept 28.118*** 
(1.418) N=10459,	R2=.142	 N=10459,	R2=.142	*	p	<	.10		**p	<	.05		***p	<	.001				  
Table 6 
President Feeling Thermometer, Economic Outlook, Region- Direct and Interactive Effects 
Direct Interactive 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Variable Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
-  Southeast * Economic 
Outlook 
.614 
(1.032) 
-  Midwest * Economic Outlook 1.003  
(1.027) 
-  Southwest * Economic 
Outlook 
.996 
(1.158) 
-  West * Economic Outlook 1.915* 
(1.068) 
Economic Outlook 11.597*** 
(.340) 
Economic Outlook 10.692*** 
(.770) 
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Southeast .905 
(.731) 
Southeast -.415 
(2.369) 
Midwest -.122  
(.718) 
Midwest -2.291 
(2.673) 
Southwest .156  
(.836) 
Southwest -2.003  
(1.929) 
West -2.034**  
(.769) 
West -6.149** 
(2.421) 
1980 3.438*** 
(.945) 
1980 3.428*** 
(.946) 
1988 8.231*** 
(.844) 
1988 8.238*** 
(.844) 
1992 -2.230** 
(.756) 
1992 -2.287** 
(.756) 
1996 4.660*** 
(.859) 
1996 4.665*** 
(.859) 
2000 .959 
(.870) 
2000 .979 
(.871) 
2004 .883  
(1.004) 
2004 .864 
(1.004) 
2008 -18.378*** 
(.991) 
2008 -18.348*** 
(.991) 
Gender 2.026*** 
(.473) 
Gender 2.024*** 
(.473) 
Party Identification -6.182*** 
(.259) 
Party Identification -6.191*** 
(.259) 
Race 1.392*** 
(.178) 
Race 1.387*** 
(.178) 
Intercept 36.514*** 
(1.422) 
Intercept 38.500*** 
(2.068) 
N=14848, R2=.156 N=14848, R2=.156 *	p	<	.10		**p	<	.05		***p	<	.001				  
Table 7 
 
Economic Perception and Outlook by Region Over Time 
Regardless of how respondents use economic evaluations in government 
evaluations, there do appear to be regional differences in economic evaluation over time. 
The following graphs show that in both the retrospective and prospective model, 
economic evaluations follow the national average but do show slightly different degrees 
of regional variation. 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
No single region tends to vary from the others significantly. All regions were 
most positive and optimistic in the late nineties, for example, which makes sense 
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considering the economic prosperity of the Clinton administration. All regions were most 
negative and pessimistic in 2008, at the start of the Great Recession. No region deviated 
from these national trends, supporting the idea that Americans think about the economy 
sociotropically.41 Despite the lack of an outlier, there is some variation between regions 
in the retrospective graph. All regions cluster around the national average. 
The prospective graph, however, shows much more variation between regions. 
Though all regions generally follow the national average for most years, they cluster less 
around the average. For example, in the retrospective model, the regions had virtually the 
same negative perception of the economy in 2008. In the prospective model, there is a 
greater difference between the maximum and minimum values.  
 
Variation Within Economic Outlook 
There is an interesting dichotomy between economic perception and outlook. 
Economic perception as a trend has varied greatly. However, region does not tend to vary 
within economic perception. Levels of economic perception have been notably high at 
some points, such as the late nineties, and quite low, such as in 2008. On the other hand, 
economic outlook as a trend has not varied much, though there is significantly more 
regional variation within economic outlook. Despite regional variation, economic outlook 
tends to hover around values indicating indifference or optimism, aside from some times- 
such as 2008- when all regions tended to be pessimistic. This is interesting, considering 
																																																								41	Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, “Sociotropic Politics: The American Case.” British Journal 
of Political Science 11 no. 2 (1981) 129-161. 	
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the significant differences in how regional economic outlook impact evaluations of the 
government. I believe that culture is the origin of economic variation, and the mechanism 
that translates this variation into significant political differences. Regions are politically 
different to begin with, due to history. As regions developed their own economies, their 
outlook on the economy became somewhat independent. When considering the 
government in terms of economic outlook, therefore, regions react differently. Regional 
differences have an important and lasting impact on political life, including overall 
evaluations of the government. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Hypotheses Revisited 
Hypothesis 1A is not proven, as both retrospective and prospective results are 
significant. However, Hypothesis 1B is indeed supported as prospective federal 
government ratings are impacted by the interaction between region and the economy. It is 
possible that because economic perception refers to the present and recent past state of 
the economy, there is not too much variation in perception across the nation. That is, it is 
fairly clear what the state of the national economy is at any given time. On the other 
hand, economic outlook allows respondents to be informed by a number of other factors. 
There is no single way to interpret a hypothetical economy. 
Furthermore, Hypotheses 2A and 2B are supported, as economic concerns are 
significantly different in most models. Therefore, region is an important factor in a 
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respondent’s outlook on the economy, and this contributes to ratings of the government. 
In the prospective federal government feeling thermometer model, economic outlook 
does indeed impact feeling thermometer ratings differently depending on region.  
Hypothesis 3 is also supported. In the retrospective model, evaluations of the 
economy by region do not vary very much. However, in the prospective model, they vary 
slightly more. Overall, all regions follow a national trend, indicating that although region 
has an impact on economic evaluations of the government, regions do not have massive 
underlying differences in economic evaluations. 
Though some of these findings are limited, they are important. More research 
must be done to determine the causes of regional differences, and to further determine the 
implications of regional differences. However, the relationship between region, the 
economy, and evaluations of the government has not been explored previously. Clearly, 
there are important aspects of political life explained by this relationship.  
 
Why Does This Matter? 
The implications of this paper are vast. If feeling thermometer scores do indeed 
predict other aspects of political life, such as ratings of other groups, association with 
political parties, or voting, then variables impacting feeling thermometer scores matter.  
Region is often discussed in politics. During presidential elections, it is clear that 
candidates understand regional differences. “Electoral math” dictates where candidates 
spend money, give major speeches, and canvass. Candidates might play up values in the 
conservative South, speak about environmental concerns on the West Coast, or pander to 
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blue collar workers about manufacturing and outsourcing in the Midwest. However, after 
the election, these appeals seem to go away. This may be due to a number of reasons- the 
most salient policies are often the result of state governments and not the federal 
government, or maybe candidates worry less about pleasing specific regions once in 
office. However, region clearly matters more than elected officials realize. A better 
understanding of how different policies might affect individuals across the country could 
improve policy, not just increase vote share. Regional differences are not necessarily 
negative, and the United State's rich array of cultures should be celebrated. When it 
comes to the economy, these differences matter. If an entire region's outlook on the 
economy has a stronger or weaker effect on its perception of the government, then it is 
worth addressing the underlying causes of that relationship.  
 
The Economy, Region, and Trump: the 2016 Election 
Though this paper does not focus on elections, it may be useful to explore the 
electoral implications of this paper. If economic concerns, both prospective and 
retrospective, have an affect on evaluations of the federal government, and if people in 
different regions interpret these effects differently, then regional politics could have 
important effects on the national political stage. One major example was the most recent 
political election, in which political cleavages seemed to shift historically. 
This paper could explain some aspects of the most recent election. While Hillary 
Clinton had name recognition, a plausible policy agenda, and the support of a popular 
president, Donald Trump's populist, headline-grabbing campaign won out electorally. I 
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argue that he achieved this victory primarily by gaining the support of states not thought 
to be in question, somewhat disregarded by the Clinton campaign. One explanation for 
the dramatic turn of states like Michigan and Wisconsin from blue to red is the priority of 
economic concerns to voters in those states. In each model, the Midwest clearly has low 
ratings of the federal government at the highest levels of economic outlook and 
perception. If voters in the Midwest rate the government systematically lower than in 
other regions, and if voters in the Midwest are displeased overall with the state of the 
economy, then the Midwest can be expected to have significantly lower ratings of the 
federal government and potentially vote for challengers.  
Region is a factor that originates from history and experience. Citizens, informed 
by their culture, past experiences, and knowledge, make decisions about the government 
and projections about the future. Furthermore, the culture in which an individual lives 
impacts the way that they perceive public policy. People in different regions relate public 
policy to their own lives in different ways.  
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APPENDIX 
Summary of Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Federal Government Feeling 
Thermometer 
17644 50.52 22.40 0 97 
Congress Feeling Thermometer 17644 51.73 21.22 0 97 
President Feeling Thermometer 17644 55.16 31.24 0 97 
Economic Perception 10511 1.62 0.60 1 3 
Economic Outlook 14912 2.16 0.71 1 3 
Gender 17644 1.54 0.50 1 2 
Race 17562 1.75 1.43 1 6 
Year 17644 2001.13 10.10 1980 2012 
Party Identification 17644 1.86 0.93 1 3 
Region 17642 2.91 1.38 1 5 
Northeast 17642 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Southeast 17642 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Midwest 17642 0.24 0.43 0 1 
West 17642 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Southwest 17642 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Northeast Interaction- 
Retrospective 
10509 0.30 0.68 0 3 
Southeast Interaction- 
Retrospective 
10509 0.37 0.74 0 3 
Midwest Interaction- 
Retrospective 
10509 0.39 0.75 0 3 
West Interaction- Retrospective 10509 0.31 0.68 0 3 
Southwest Interaction- 
Retrospective 
10509 0.25 0.63 0 3 
Northeast Interaction- 
Prospective 
14910 0.41 0.91 0 3 
Southeast Interaction- 
Prospective 
14910 0.50 0.98 0 3 
Midwest Interaction- Prospective 14910 0.52 0.97 0 3 
West Interaction- Prospective 14910 0.41 0.90 0 3 
Southwest Interaction- 
Prospective 
14910 0.32 0.83 0 3 
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